Security at the pump: What fuel operators should be watching

Fuel operations have always required careful control over physical assets, transactions and inventory. But as more infrastructure becomes connected, the security picture is becoming more complex.

Recent developments involving automatic tank gauges, fuel theft and pump tampering highlight how varied security risks can be — from cyber exposure in connected infrastructure to misuse of an open fuel transaction at the pump.

For fuel distributors, marketers and cardlock operators, the common thread is operational control: understanding where risks can emerge, knowing who is responsible for the systems involved, and maintaining reliable processes across the business.

Connected tank gauges are attracting attention

In June 2026, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), together with the FBI, NSA and several other federal agencies, warned of malicious cyber activity targeting US-based automatic tank gauge (ATG) systems.

ATGs are widely used to remotely monitor storage tank information such as fuel levels, temperature and potential leaks. According to CISA, attackers have compromised internet-exposed ATG systems and modified them through command execution. The US government said it had not attributed the activity to a specific nation-state or threat actor group at the time of the advisory.

The potential consequences extend beyond inaccurate information on a screen. CISA noted that a compromised system could allow a threat actor to alter settings including product identifiers and tank volumes, interfere with pump controls, or create conditions in which operators lose visibility of tank fill levels.

The warning followed the disclosure of a critical vulnerability affecting Veeder-Root TLS4B automatic tank gauge systems. CISA advisory ICSA-25-296-03 assigned CVE-2025-58428 a CVSS v4 score of 9.4 and described it as remotely exploitable with low attack complexity. Veeder-Root recommends upgrading affected TLS4B systems running versions earlier than 11.A to version 11.A.

For operators that rely on connected tank-gauge infrastructure, these advisories provide a useful reason to understand which systems are in use, how they are connected, which firmware versions are running and who is responsible for maintaining them.

Cyber risk is also a question of connectivity

The recent ATG warnings highlight a broader issue: operational technology that was once relatively isolated can now be connected to wider business networks or remotely accessible.

CISA's guidance focuses heavily on that connectivity. It recommends that ATG owners and operators reduce public internet exposure, review remote access, maintain strong credentials, and monitor system activity.

For fuel businesses, that raises some useful questions to consider with the people responsible for IT, site technology or managed services:

• Which fuel-related systems can be reached remotely?
• Who is responsible for maintaining connected equipment?
• How are software and firmware versions tracked?
• How quickly would unusual system behavior or unexpected readings be noticed?

These are not necessarily questions that operations teams need to answer themselves. But knowing who owns the answers can be an important part of understanding the wider operational environment.

Not every threat is high-tech

At the other end of the spectrum, some risks at the pump require very little technology at all. One established form of fuel theft is commonly referred to as pump switching. In a typical scenario, a customer finishes fueling but the transaction remains active. Another person can then use the still-authorized pump and have additional fuel charged to the original customer's payment method.

The issue drew renewed attention in the US this year as warnings about fuel-pump scams circulated alongside higher fuel prices. Reporting in May distinguished established pump-switching fraud from unverified claims about screws or bolts being used to keep transactions open. In July, however, CBS Detroit reported that Michigan police were investigating a pump where a hole and screw had been found in the pump nozzle holder, potentially preventing the transaction from closing properly.

One documented incident does not mean this form of tampering is widespread. It does, however, illustrate how physical manipulation of equipment can sit alongside more familiar forms of transaction fraud.

For site operators, incidents like these are another reminder that security at the pump includes both connected technology and physical fueling equipment.

The role of operational control

Cybersecurity controls and site security are specialist areas in their own right, and a fuel management system does not replace either. But both sit within a broader operational environment where accurate information, consistent processes, and visibility across the business matter greatly.

Operational control also depends on having a clear view of transactions, inventory and financial activity. Trinium Fuel brings these core fuel-management processes together in one system, helping operators work from a more consistent operational picture.

By consolidating processes including order receipt, customer service, operations, credit management, billing and inventory control, fuel businesses can maintain a more consistent operational picture across workflows rather than relying on fragmented or heavily manual processes. Trinium Fuel also provides reporting capabilities designed to give operators greater visibility into financial and operational performance.

Visibility alone does not eliminate the security risks, but it can support the wider discipline of running a controlled, well-understood fuel operation.

Fuel businesses have always needed to keep track of physical assets, transactions and inventory. As infrastructure becomes more connected, while familiar forms of fraud continue to evolve, that operational picture is becoming more complex.

Staying aware of emerging risks, understanding where responsibility sits, and maintaining reliable processes across the business can help operators navigate that complexity with greater confidence.

Compiled from public reporting and government advisories for customer awareness. Trinium was not involved in the incidents described.